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Abstract
This paper compares the roles classical and intuitionistic logic play
in restricting the free use of truth principles in arithmetic. We consider
fifteen of the most commonly used axiomatic principles of truth and
classify every subset of them as either consistent or inconsistent over
a weak purely intuitionistic theory of truth.
1 Introduction
There have been many proposals regarding how one may overcome the para-
doxes induced by the liar sentence and its variants to obtain consistent
axiomatic theories of truth. Feferman [1] observes three possible routes to-
wards consistency. These involve restrictions of language, logic, or truth
principles. An example of the first direction is Tarski’s hierarchy of truth,
formalised, for example, in Feferman [2] and Halbach [4]. Theories involving
only the second restriction require the adoption of logics based on more than
two truth values, partial logics or paraconsistent logics. Feferman, however,
rejects the use of non-standard logics, i.e. logics other than classical or intu-
itionistic logic, as in these logics “nothing like sustained ordinary reasoning
can be carried out” [1, p. 95]. The third direction is exemplified by the
work of Friedman and Sheard [3]. The naive notion of truth is removed in
favour of twelve principles, referred to as Optional Axioms, each conveying
some desirable property of truth. These include direct weakenings of the
Tarskian bi-conditional in the form of one direction of the equivalence or
rules of inference, axioms for truth repetition and deletion, axioms ensuring
commutation between quantifiers and the truth predicate, and axioms of
truth completeness and consistency (see table 1 below for the complete list
of axioms considered). All subsets of the twelve principles were characterised
as either consistent or inconsistent over a classical base theory of truth, the
upshot being nine maximal consistent subsets of the Optional Axioms (see
theorem 3.2 below).
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The aim of this paper is to investigate the role classical logic has on
restricting the free use of these truth principles. In [3] a classical base theory,
BaseT, is used incorporating a truth predicate whose underlying logic is also
classical, i.e. BaseT ` T(pA ∨ ¬Aq) for every sentence A where pAq denotes
the Go¨del number of A. We will carry out the Friedman-Sheard programme
in a purely intuitionistic environment making use of a base theory in which
neither the underlying logic nor the logic of the truth predicate is declared
classical. Friedman and Sheard proved a number of inconsistency results
regarding subsets of the Optional Axioms; however, the majority of these
proofs make use of classical principles inherent in the base theory and it
is not immediate that they can be eliminated. Furthermore, the following
four principles are all equivalent over the classical base theory used by the
authors, when stated for arbitrary sentences A and B of LT .
T(pAq) ∨ T(p¬Aq),
¬T(pAq)→ T(p¬Aq),
T(pA ∨Bq)→ T(pAq) ∨ T(pBq),
(T(pAq)→ T(pBq))→ T(pA→ Bq).
Using the intuitionistic base theory proposed here the first axiom implies
the remaining three and the second is a consequence of the fourth, but these
appear to be the only (non-classical) logical dependencies between them: to
deduce the first from the second or fourth, one requires classical logic and
to deduce the first from the third a classical truth predicate is required.
2 Intuitionistic logic
There are many ways to formulate first-order intuitionistic predicate calcu-
lus. We shall make use of the Hilbert-style formulation presented in, for
example, [8, §2.4]. The basic logical connectives are ∧, ∨ and →; with ⊥ a
logical constant. Negation is considered defined: ¬A abbreviates the impli-
cation A→ ⊥. The rules of inference are modus ponens and generalisation.
Let L denote the basic language of arithmetic and LT the language L
augmented with a unary predicate symbol T. We will make use of models
of intuitionistic logic, in particular intuitionistic Kripke ω-structures for LT,
which are introduced below. N denotes the standard model of arithmetic.
Definition 2.1 A first-order intuitionistic Kripke ω-structure for LT is a
triple M = 〈WM,≤M,TM〉 where 〈WM,≤M〉 is a partially-ordered Kripke
frame, TM ⊆WM×N, and the following persistency requirement is satisfied:
whenever u ≤M v ∈WM,
〈u,m〉 ∈ TM implies 〈v,m〉 ∈ TM
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for every m ∈ N.
We write Tu for the set {x : 〈u, x〉 ∈ TM}. WM is referred to as the
carrier of M, w ∈ WM as a world of M, and Tw as the interpretation of
truth at w.
A Kripke ω-structure determines a satisfaction relation, u  A, for u ∈
WM and sentences A in LT defined as follows.
1. w  ⊥ does not hold for any w ∈WM,
2. w  R(t0, . . . , tn−1) iff R(t0, . . . , tn−1) is true in N, where R is an
n-ary predicate symbol in L for a primitive recursive relation and t0,
. . . , tn−1 are closed terms of L,
3. w  T(s) iff sN ∈ Tw,
4. w  A ∧B iff w  A and w  B,
5. w  A ∨B iff either w  A or w  B,
6. w  A→ B iff for every u ≥ w u  A implies u  B,
7. w  ∃xA(x) iff there is an n ∈ N such that w  A(n¯),
8. w  ∀xA(x) iff for every u ≥ w and every n ∈ N, u  A(n¯).
We may write M to emphasise the relation  is defined with respect to
M and drop the subscript M from WM and TM when M is clear from the
context. If M is an intuitionistic Kripke ω-structure and A is a sentence of
LT, M models A, written M |= A, if w  A for every w ∈WM.
An intuitionistic Kripke ω-structure M = 〈WM,≤M,TM〉 is a classical
(ω-)model if its universe has at most one element, i.e. |WM| = 1. In that
case M is determined by Tw where w ∈WM and TM = {w} × Tw.
Intuitionistic first-order predicate calculus (IPC) is sound with respect to
the class of intuitionistic Kripke ω-structures, since it is sound with respect
to all Kripke structures (see, for example, [5, 8]).
We may assume L contains a function symbol for every primitive re-
cursive function and that we have some primitive recursive Go¨del coding,
p.q of LT-formulae. If f is a primitive recursive function we denote by f.
its corresponding symbol in L. Let HA denote the theory of Heyting arith-
metic, the intuitionistic theory with the usual Peano axioms for successor
and multiplication, defining axioms for every primitive recursive function
and the schema of induction for all formulae in its language. Denote by HAT
the theory HA formulated in the language LT, that is, with the induction
schema extended to include all formulae of LT. We say a theory S has the
disjunction property if, whenever S ` A ∨ B, either S ` A or S ` B holds,
and has the existence property if whenever S ` ∃xA(x) there is a term t
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such that S ` A(t). It is well known that HA has both the disjunction and
existence property (see, for example [8, chap. 3, thm. 5.10]). This also holds
for HAT; the presence of the truth predicate has no effect on the proof.
To each logical connective ∗ is associated a primitive recursive function
symbol ∗. in L representing it for sentences: that is, for all sentences A, B
in LT, (pAq ∗. pBq) = pA ∗ Bq, for ∗ each of ∧, ∨, →; and that if either x
or y is not the code of a sentence of LT, x ∗. y = p0¯ = 1¯q, where n¯ denotes
the n-th numeral. ¬. x abbreviates x→. p⊥q.
It will be necessary to quantify over codes of LT sentences and formulae
of LT with at most one free variable and thus we introduce the following
notation. Let SentL′(x) denote the formal predicate which expresses ‘x is
the code of a sentence of L′’ and let subn(m,n) denote the primitive recursive
function such that subn(pA(x)q, n) = pA(n¯)q if A is a formula of LT with at
most x free. If m is not the code of a sentence with at most one free variable
subn(m,n) = p0¯ = 1¯q. We then introduce the following abbreviations.
• ∀pAqF (pAq) abbreviates ∀x(SentLT (x)→ F (x)),
• ∃pAqF (pAq) abbreviates ∃x(SentLT (x) ∧ F (x)),
• ∀pA(x)qF (pA(x)q) abbreviates ∀x(SentLT (subn. (x, 0¯))→ F (x)),
• ∃pA(x)qF (pA(x)q) abbreviates ∃x(SentLT (subn. (x, 0¯)) ∧ F (x)).
To simplify uses of the function subn we make use of the dot convention for
variables, namely, by pA(x˙)q we represent the term subn(pA(x)q, x).
3 A closer look at the Optional Axioms
We can now define the base theory BaseiT over which our analysis takes place.
Definition 3.1 Let BaseiT denote the theory extending HAT with the addi-
tional axioms:
1. T-Imp: ∀x∀y(T(x) ∧ T(x→. y)→ T(y)),
2. ∀x(vali(x)→ T(ucl. (x))),
3. ∀x(AxPRA(x)→ T(x)),
where vali(x) expresses that x is the Go¨del number of an intuitionistically
valid first-order LT-formula and AxPRA(x) expresses that x is the Go¨del num-
ber of a non-logical axiom of primitive recursive arithmetic. BaseT is the the-
ory BaseiT formulated in classical logic plus the the principles ∀pAq(T(pA ∨
¬Aq)) stating that the underlying logic of the predicate T is classical.
Table 1, below, lists the twelve principles of truth considered by Friedman
and Sheard. The next theorem summarises the work of [3].
4
Name Axiom Schema
T-In ∀x(A(x)→ T(pA(x˙)q))
T-Out ∀x(T(pA(x˙)q)→ A(x))
Name Axiom
T-Rep ∀x(T(x)→ T(pT(x˙)q))
T-Del ∀x(T(pT(x˙)q)→ T(x))
T-Cons ∀x¬(T(x) ∧ T(¬. x))
T-Comp ∀pAq(T(pAq) ∨ T(p¬Aq))
∀-Inf ∀pA(x)q(∀nT(pA(n˙)q)→ T(p∀xA(x)q))
∃-Inf ∀pA(x)q(T(p∃xA(x)q)→ ∃nT (pA(n˙)q))
Name Rule of inference
T-Intro From A(x) infer T(pA(x˙)q)
T-Elim From T(pA(x˙)q) infer A(x)
¬T-Intro From ¬A(x) infer ¬T(pA(x˙)q)
¬T-Elim From ¬T(pA(x˙)q) infer ¬A(x).
Table 1: List of principles considered by Friedman and Sheard.
Theorem 3.2 (Friedman and Sheard [3]) The following are the only max-
imal consistent subsets of the twelve Optional Axioms listed in table 1, over
BaseT.
A. T-In, T-Del, T-Intro, T-Rep, ¬T-Elim, T-Comp, ∀-Inf, ∃-Inf.
B. T-Rep, T-Cons, T-Comp, ∀-Inf, ∃-Inf.
C. T-Del, T-Cons, T-Comp, ∀-Inf, ∃-Inf.
D. T-Intro, T-Elim, T-Cons, T-Comp, ¬T-Elim, ¬T-Intro, ∀-Inf, ∃-Inf.
E. T-Intro, T-Elim, T-Del, T-Cons, ¬T-Intro, ∀-Inf.
F. T-Intro, T-Elim, T-Del, ¬T-Elim, ∀-Inf.
G. T-Intro, T-Elim, T-Rep, ¬T-Elim, ∀-Inf.
H. T-Out, T-Rep, T-Elim, T-Del, T-Cons, ¬T-Intro, ∀-Inf.
I. T-Rep, T-Del, T-Elim, ¬T-Elim, ∀-Inf.
The independence of the connectives under intuitionistic logic naturally
provides three further principles of truth to consider, which are presented
in table 2. We refer to the principles in tables 1 and 2 as Optional Axioms.
The additional axioms listed in table 2 are all equivalent to T-Comp over
BaseT. Over Base
i
T, however, T-Comp implies all three and T-Comp(w)
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is a consequence of →-Inf, but these appear to be the only dependencies
between them; to deduce T-Comp from either T-Comp(w) or →-Inf, one
requires classical logic and to deduce T-Comp from ∨-Inf a classical truth
predicate is required (cf. propositions 3.3 and 3.4 below).
Name Axiom
T-Comp(w) ∀pBq[¬T(pBq)→ T(p¬Bq)]
∨-Inf ∀pAq∀pBq[T(pA ∨Bq)→ T(pAq) ∨ T(pBq)]
→-Inf ∀pAq∀pBq[(T(pAq)→ T(pBq))→ T(pA→ Bq)]
Table 2: Additional Optional Axioms inspired by intuitionistic logic.
The move to intuitionistic logic provides more freedom to express princi-
ples of truth without falling into inconsistency. For example, over BaseT the
principles of truth disjunction and truth existence, ∨-Inf and ∃-Inf respec-
tively, both imply T-Comp and are consistent with a set of Optional Axioms
only if T-Comp is. Over BaseiT, however, the two principles are consistent
with every consistent subset of the Optional Axioms.
It is worth remarking on the use of relativised quantifiers in these axioms,
as compared with the unrelativised form that the other Optional Axioms.
Stating T-Comp(w) in its unrelativised form, ∀x(¬T(x) → T(¬. x)), and as-
suming the simple statement T(x) → SentLT(x) (which one would want to
be consistent with all sets of Optional Axioms) one could obtain ¬T(n¯) if n
is not the code of an LT-sentence, and hence
T(n¯→. p⊥q). (1)
However, we assumed (x→. y) = p0¯ = 1¯q if either x or y is not the code of an
LT-sentence, so eq. (1) yields T(p⊥q), and hence, by T-Imp, T(pAq) for every
LT-sentence A. Not only would this be inconsistent with a large portion
of the Optional Axioms, it does not express the intuitive concept behind
T-Comp(w), namely that whenever it is inconsistent to state a sentence
A is true, ¬A is true. The problem can be resolved by relativising the
quantifier to only range over codes of LT-sentences. Perhaps one may also
fix the problem by defining x →. y so that it is equal to p0¯ = 1¯q if y is
not the code of a sentence, but equal to p0¯ = 0¯q if x is not the code of a
sentence. If stated for non-sentences, T-Comp(w) and T-Comp would then
hold vacuously, but this will only cause to complicate matters later where
we must forever perform a case distinction in the back of our minds when
utilising →. . A similar situation arises when considering the axiom →-Inf.
In the end, the change is purely cosmetic and so we pick the relativised
form which provides less opportunity for problems in the long term. Before
we continue it is worth noting that this issue does not arise for T-Cons (the
only other principle making explicit use of negation) which the reader can
easily check.
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One may reasonably ask whether the principles proposed in table 2 are, in
fact, new principles and are not subsumed by any axioms or group of axioms
already considered. It is not hard to see that T-Comp(w) is classically
equivalent to T-Comp and on closer inspection ∨-Inf is also equivalent to T-
Comp provided the truth predicate behaves classically. It is slightly harder
to see where →-Inf fits in. Let BasecT denote BaseiT augmented with the
axiom of truth classicism, the axiom ∀pAq T(pA ∨ ¬Aq).
The next proposition shows T-Comp is equivalent over BaseT to each
Optional Axiom in table 2, so theorem 3.2 can be extended to involve the
additional axioms.
Proposition 3.3
(i). BaseiT ` T-Comp→ (T-Comp(w) ∧ (∨-Inf) ∧ (→-Inf)),
(ii). BaseiT ` (→-Inf)→ T-Comp(w),
(iii). BaseT ` (T-Comp(w) ∨ (→-Inf))→ T-Comp,
(iv). BasecT ` (∨-Inf)→ T-Comp.
Proof (i). (A∨B)→ (¬A→ B) is intuitionistically valid, so by the second
axiom of BaseiT,
BaseiT ` ∀x∀yT((x ∨. y)→. (¬. x→. y)).
Two applications of T-Imp, yields BaseiT ` [T(x∨. y)∧T(¬. x)]→ T(y), whence
BaseiT ` T-Comp→ ∨-Inf.
By direct use of the first implication we also see that T-Comp→ T-Comp(w)
is provable in BaseiT. This leaves only →-Inf. (¬A ∨ B) → (A → B) is
intuitionistically valid, so
∀pAq∀pBq[(T(p¬Aq) ∨ T(pBq))→ T(pA→ Bq)]
is a theorem of BaseiT; but then so is
∀pAq∀pBq[(T(pAq) ∨ T(p¬Aq))→
[(T(pAq)→ T(pBq))→ T(pA→ Bq)]].
Thus, BaseiT ` T-Comp→ (→-Inf).
(ii). BaseiT ` ¬T(x)→ (T(x)→ T(p⊥q)), so
BaseiT ` (→-Inf)→ ∀pAq[¬T(pAq)→ T(pA→ ⊥q)],
that is, BaseiT ` →-Inf→ T-Comp(w).
(iii). From T(pAq) ∨ ¬T(pAq) and ¬T(pAq)→ T(p¬Aq) one immediately
obtains T(pAq) ∨ T(p¬Aq); thus BaseT ` T-Comp(w)→ T-Comp. This with
(ii) above, finishes the case.
(iv). Apply ∨-Inf to the axiom of truth classicism in BasecT. 
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It is natural to suppose, however, that ∨-Inf, T-Comp(w), →-Inf and T-
Comp are not mutually equivalent when the underlying logic and the logic
of the truth predicate is non-classical. Let
T0 = {〈0, pBq〉 : HAT ` B}, T1 = {〈1, pBq〉 : PAT ` B}, T2 = {2} × N,
and let≤ be the standard ordering on N. Define three intuitionistic ω-models
as follows.
M0 =〈{0},≤,T0〉,
M1 =〈{0, 2},≤,T0 ∪ T2〉,
M2 =〈{1, 2},≤,T1 ∪ T2〉.
M0 is a classical model and it is not hard to see that these are all models of
BaseiT. M0 |= ¬T-Comp(w) ∧ ¬T-Comp and, since HAT has the disjunction
property M0 |= ∨-Inf.
M1 also models ∨-Inf for the same reason. Since 2 M1 T(n¯) for every
n ∈ N, we see M1 |= T-Comp(w) vacuously. It is clear, though, that 0 6M1
∀pAq(T(pAq)∨T(p¬Aq)) so M1 is not a model of T-Comp. Similarly M2 |=
T-Comp(w) and M2 6|= T-Comp, but this time M2 6|= ∨-Inf as, for example,
if B is the formalised consistency statement for PA, 1  T(pB ∨ ¬Bq), but
clearly 1 6 T(pBq) ∨ T(p¬Bq).
This method has successfully furnished us with models that show the
implications
T-Comp(w)→ T-Comp,
∨-Inf→ T-Comp,
T-Comp(w)→ ∨-Inf,
∨-Inf→ T-Comp(w),
are not theorems of BaseiT. They do not show, however, that the prin-
ciples T-Comp(w) and ¬∨-Inf, or T-Comp(w) and ¬T-Comp are mutu-
ally consistent (for example 0 M1 ¬T-Comp whereas 2 M1 T-Comp, so
M1 6|= ¬T-Comp). Another criticism of the models is that M1 and M2
satisfy T-Comp(w) vacuously, that is neither satisfies ¬T(n¯) for any n ∈ N.
The next proposition addresses these short-comings, showing there are in-
tuitionistic models which accept one of T-Comp(w), ∨-Inf or →-Inf, while
refuting T-Comp.
Proposition 3.4 There are intuitionistic ω-models of BaseiT, A0 and A1,
such that
A0 |= ∨-Inf ∧ ¬T-Comp(w) ∧ ¬(→-Inf) ∧ ¬T-Comp,
A1 |=¬∨-Inf ∧ T-Comp(w) ∧ →-Inf ∧ ¬T-Comp.
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Proof M0, as defined above, plays the role of A0. Since T-Comp(w) is a
consequence of →-Inf over BaseiT, we deduce A0 |= ¬(→-Inf). A suitable
model A1 can be obtained from M1 by stratifying its construction. Let
2<ω denote the set of finite binary sequences, let ≤ be the relation ‘initial
segment of’ on 2<ω, |σ| denote the length of the sequence σ and suppose
A0, A1, . . . is an enumeration of the LT formulae. We will define a theory
Tσ for every σ ∈ 2<ω by induction on the length of σ: T〈〉 := PA where 〈〉
denotes the empty sequence, and for i = 0, 1,
Tσ_i :=
{
{B : Tσ + (¬)iA|σ| ` B}, if this set is consistent,
Tσ, otherwise,
where (¬)iA abbreviates A, if i = 0, and ¬A, if i = 1. Note that Tσ forms a
consistent classical theory for every σ. For this reason whenever Tσ+B ` C
and Tσ + ¬B ` C it must be the case that Tσ ` C. Thus,
C ∈ Tσ_0 ∩ Tσ_1 implies C ∈ Tσ. (2)
Let A1 = 〈2<ω,≤, Tˆ〉, where Tˆ = {〈σ, pBq〉 : σ ∈ 2<ω ∧ B ∈ Tσ}. Since
Tσ ⊆ Tτ whenever σ ≤ τ , it follows that A1 is an intuitionistic ω-model. In
order to show A1 |= T-Comp(w), i.e.
A1 |= ∀pBq(¬T(pBq)→ T(p¬Bq)),
it suffices to deduce σ  ¬T(pAkq) → T(p¬Akq) for every σ ∈ 2<ω and
k ∈ N. Fix some k ∈ N. We show that Ak 6∈ Tτ for every τ extending σ
implies (¬Ak) ∈ Tσ for every k ∈ N and every σ ∈ 2<ω by induction on the
difference k − |σ|.
Case I. k − |σ| ≤ 0. Then |σ| ≥ k and Ak has already been seen in the
construction of Tσ_0. Therefore, assuming Ak 6∈ Tτ for every τ extending
σ, Ak must be inconsistent with Tρ for some initial segment of ρ of σ (if
k = |σ| take ρ = σ). In that case Ak is also inconsistent with Tσ, hence
Tσ ` ¬Ak and so (¬Ak) ∈ Tσ.
Case II. k − |σ| > 0. Suppose Ak 6∈ Tτ for every τ extending σ. By the
induction hypothesis we obtain (¬Ak) ∈ Tσ_0 ∩Tσ_1 and thus (¬Ak) ∈ Tσ
by eq. (2).
The argument for T-Comp(w) can be generalised to also deduce A1 |=
→-Inf: we show by induction on k+ l− |σ| that if Ak ∈ Tτ implies Al ∈ Tτ
for every τ extending σ, in fact (Ak → Al) ∈ Tσ. This suffices to prove
σ  (T(pAkq)→ T(pAlq))→ T(pAk → Alq),
and hence σ →-Inf.
Case I. k + l − |σ| ≤ 0. Therefore |σ| ≥ k + l and the sentences Ak and
Al have already been encountered in the construction of Tσ_0. Suppose
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Ak ∈ Tτ implies Al ∈ Tτ whenever τ extends σ. If Ak 6∈ Tσ_0 it follows
that (¬Ak) ∈ Tσ since k ≤ |σ|, and hence (Ak → Al) ∈ Tσ. Otherwise, by
the assumption, Al ∈ Tσ; whence also (Ak → Al) ∈ Tσ.
Case II. k + l − |σ| > 0. Suppose τ  T(pAkq) → T(pAlq) for every τ
extending σ. The induction hypothesis entails (Ak → Al) ∈ Tσ_0 ∩ Tσ_1,
whence (Ak → Al) ∈ Tσ by eq. (2).
Furthermore, as Tσ forms a consistent theory for every σ ∈ 2<ω and
at no point will Tσ be complete, A1 |= ¬T-Comp. Explicitly, for each
σ ∈ 2<ω let Bσ be the formalised consistency statement for Tσ (which may
be defined since Tσ is a finite extension of PA). Bσ is independent of Tσ,
hence σ 6 T(pBσq) ∨ T(p¬Bσq). Thus τ  ¬∀pAq(T(pAq) ∨ T(p¬Aq)) for
every τ ∈ 2<ω.
Finally, each Tσ is classical, so A1 |= BasecT, whence proposition 3.3
implies also A1 |= ¬∨-Inf. In sum,
A1 |= ¬∨-Inf ∧ T-Comp(w) ∧→-Inf ∧ ¬T-Comp. 
4 The main theorem
We are now in a position to state the main theorem of this paper, the proof
of which constitutes sections 5 to 7.
Theorem 4.1 The following are the only maximal consistent subsets of the
Optional Axioms, over BaseiT.
Ai. T-In, T-Intro, T-Rep, T-Del, T-Comp, ¬T -Elim, ∀-Inf, ∃-Inf, ∨-Inf,
T-Comp(w), →-Inf.
Bi. T-Rep, T-Cons, T-Comp, ∀-Inf, ∃-Inf, T-Comp(w), ∨-Inf, →-Inf.
Ci. T-Del, T-Cons, T-Comp, ∀-Inf, ∃-Inf, T-Comp(w), ∨-Inf, →-Inf.
Di. T-Intro, T-Elim, T-Cons, T-Comp, ¬T -Intro, ¬T -Elim, ∀-Inf, ∃-Inf,
T-Comp(w), ∨-Inf, →-Inf.
Ei. T-Intro, T-Elim, T-Del, T-Cons, ¬T -Intro, ∀-Inf, ∃-Inf, ∨-Inf.
Fi. T-Intro, T-Elim, T-Del, ¬T -Elim, ∀-Inf, ∃-Inf, T-Comp(w), ∨-Inf.
Gi. T-In, T-Intro, T-Elim, T-Rep, ¬T -Elim, ∀-Inf, ∃-Inf, T-Comp(w),
∨-Inf, →-Inf.
Hi. T-Out, T-Rep, T-Elim, ¬T -Intro, T-Del, T-Cons, ∀-Inf, ∃-Inf, ∨-Inf.
Ii. T-Rep, T-Del, T-Elim, ¬T -Elim, ∀-Inf, ∃-Inf, T-Comp(w), ∨-Inf.
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If we ignore the additional axioms presented in table 2 for the time being
and examine the effect altering the base theory has on the consistent subsets
of the Optional Axioms considered by Friedman and Sheard, one might
expect some of the inconsistencies between axioms or rules of inference break
down; i.e., the maximal consistent sets grow as we weaken the background
logic and even spawn new maximal consistent sets of the Optional Axioms.
As it happens, perhaps surprisingly, this does not appear to be the case; most
of the inconsistencies are derivable without the use of classical principles.
It was observed in [3] that ∃-Inf implies T-Comp over BaseT and any set
consistent with T-Comp is consistent with ∃-Inf. On the other hand with
an intuitionistic base theory the dependency dissolves and ∃-Inf becomes
consistent with all subsets of the Optional Axioms, just as ∀-Inf is in the
classical setting. The only other change is in the consistency of T-In with G.
T-In and T-Elim are classically inconsistent, but intuitionistically consistent.
We will discuss why this is the case in section 5 where we present a model
of Gi.
If we now consider T-Comp(w), ∨-Inf and →-Inf the result appears to
offer no significant difference. Like ∃-Inf, ∨-Inf becomes consistent with
all subsets of the Optional Axioms. T-Comp(w) and →-Inf on the other
hand behave more in line with T-Comp: T-Comp(w) is consistent with all
subsets of the Optional Axioms excluding those that contain T-Cons and are
inconsistent with T-Comp; →-Inf is consistent with those subsets consistent
with T-Comp(w) but not containing both T-Del and T-Elim.
Figure 1: Consistencies and inconsistencies over BaseiT + T-Cons.
Figures 1 and 2 show the consistency or inconsistency of subsets of the
Optional Axioms over the theories BaseiT + T-Cons and Base
i
T + T-Comp
respectively. The arrows represent logical implication; for example closure
under T-Intro or inclusion of T-Rep follow from assuming T-In. A thick
black line connecting or surrounding principles denotes these are inconsis-
tent over the respective base theory and a dashed line represents the con-
necting principles are consistent. These two charts are in fact identical to
charts 2 and 3 presented in [3] for the classical theories BaseT + T-Cons
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Figure 2: Consistencies and inconsistencies over BaseiT + T-Comp.
and BaseT + T-Comp, and are complete in the sense that the consistency
or inconsistency over BaseiT + T-Cons (respectively Base
i
T + T-Comp) of any
subset of the Optional Axioms may be determined from these figures; con-
sistency naturally inherits downwards and inconsistency upwards. ∀-Inf,
∃-Inf, ∨-Inf, →-Inf and T-Comp(w) need not be included in the figures for
the reasons descried above. Thus we observe that BaseT may safely replace
BaseiT in these charts and they would remain correct and complete (but with
different conditions on the treatment of ∃-Inf).
Figure 3: Consistencies and inconsistencies over BaseiT + T-Comp(w).
Friedman and Sheard [3] observe a near-perfect symmetry between the
two charts with the only exception of the lower-right consistency in fig. 1
being broken by the inconsistency of T-Rep and T-Elim in fig. 2. One
may reasonably question whether replacing T-Comp with the weaker T-
Comp(w), or perhaps →-Inf, alters the structure of this figure and if so
whether symmetry with figure 1 is gained. This new scenario is presented
as figure 3 which is again a complete chart. Compared with fig. 2, the T-
Elim, T-Del inconsistency has been replaced by the consistency of ¬T-Elim,
T-Intro, T-Elim and T-Del, marked by the presence of the four additional
boxes in the chart, and the T-Rep, T-Elim inconsistency has been broken
by the new consistency line between T-In and T-Elim. Perfect symmetry
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with fig. 1 is still not obtained, due to the inconsistency lines between T-
Out and T-Intro, and between T-Rep and T-Intro in fig. 1. Therefore lack
of symmetry between T-Cons and T-Comp(w) over BaseT was not due to
the presence of classical logic. Similarly, complete symmetry would not be
obtained if the base theory is adjusted to BasecT; since Base
c
T+T-Elim extends
BaseT, T-Rep and T-Elim are inconsistent over Base
c
T + T-Comp(w), while
T-Del and T-Intro are consistent over BasecT + T-Cons.
Figure 4: Consistencies and inconsistencies over BaseiT +→-Inf.
One does appear closer to symmetry if one replaces T-Comp(w) by →-
Inf, as shown in fig. 4. The T-Elim, T-Del inconsistency present in fig. 2 is
regained, corresponding to the inconsistency of T-Rep, T-Intro over BaseiT +
T-Cons. However, T-In and T-Elim are still consistent over BaseiT +→-Inf,
whereas T-Out and T-Intro are inconsistent over BaseiT + T-Cons (in fact
they are inconsistent over BaseiT). The duality of truth and falsity might
explain the near symmetry of figs. 1 and 4, but the natural principle dual
to →-Inf would appear to be the axiom T-Imp, and although there are
connections between T-Cons and T-Imp (see, for example, [6, §4.1.2]), the
informal meaning behind →-Inf feels a far cry from the intuition behind
T-Imp or T-Cons. Perhaps the closeness of figs. 1 and 4 is more to do
with some peculiarity inherent in the base theory, rather than a similarity
between concepts.
Now consider fig. 5, in which consistencies and inconsistencies over BaseiT+
T-Cons + T-Comp(w) are marked. All pairings across consistency lines are
contradictory making this a complete chart. It is also identical to the classi-
cal case (over BaseT+T-Cons+T-Comp as in [3, Chart 4]) and so we observe
that a subset of the Optional Axioms is consistent over BaseiT + T-Cons +
T-Comp(w) if and only if it is consistent over BaseT + T-Cons + T-Comp.
5 Consistencies
In this section we will establish the consistency of each of the nine sets of
Optional Axioms listed in theorem 4.1. As T-Comp(w), ∨-Inf and →-Inf
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Figure 5: Consistencies and inconsistencies over BaseiT + T-Cons +
T-Comp(w).
are all consequences of T-Comp, the theories Ai, Bi, Ci and Di are each a
subset of their classical counterpart, and so consistent by theorem 3.2. For
completeness, though, we shall present their model constructions as found
in [3].
Ai. Let A be the classical everything is true model 〈N,N〉. Then A |= Ai
and as in the classical setting, this is, essentially, the only model of Ai.
Bi, Ci. Let A0 be the classical it is true that everything is true model
〈N, {pBq : 〈N,N〉 |= B}〉 and A1 = 〈N, {pBq : 〈N, ∅〉 |= B}〉, it is true that
everything is false. A0 |= Bi and A1 |= Ci.
Di. Define a sequence of classical models
A0 = 〈N, ∅〉,
An+1 = 〈N, {pBq : An |= B}〉.
Let Th∞ = {B : ∃n∀k > nAk |= B}. Then Th∞ is a consistent theory
containing Di and closed under T-Intro, ¬T-Intro, T-Elim and ¬T-Elim.
Each of the remaining theories contain ∨-Inf and ∃-Inf but not T-Comp,
so we will necessarily need non-classical interpretations of the truth pred-
icates. Moreover, the presence of T-Elim, coupled with either T-Rep or
T-Del means the interpretation of the truth predicate shifts from notions of
satisfaction in certain classical ω-models to notions of provability in intu-
itionistic ω-logic (cf. [3, §3]). In order to then establish the consistency of
∃-Inf and ∨-Inf one needs to show these theories of ω-logic have the disjunc-
tion and existence property. This can be achieved by replacing the model
constructions in [3] by slash constructions.
If the truth predicate is interpreted as provability, the presence of ∀-
Inf ensures this is provability in ω-logic. Hence we make substantial use
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of derivations in intuitionistic ω-logic; writing S `ω A denotes that A is
derivable from the axioms and rules of S, which is usually an intuitionistic
theory, with the inclusion of the ω-rule in place of generalisation: S `ω A(n¯)
for every n implies S `ω ∀xA(x). By S ` A we denote ordinary (finitistic)
provability in intuitionistic logic. The next proposition is a corollary of
Troelstra and van Dalen’s proof of the disjunction and existence property
for HA [8, chap. 3, thm. 5.10].
Proposition 5.1 HAT has the disjunction and existence property when for-
mulated in ω-logic.
5.1 Consistency of Ei
Define a sequence of intuitionistic theories of truth as follows.
Th0 = Base
i
T + T-Cons + ∀-Inf + ∃-Inf + ∨-Inf,
Thn+1 = Th0 + T-Del + {T(pAq) : A is an LT-sentence and Thn ` A}.
Provided each Thn is consistent and Thn+1 ` T(pAq) only if Thn ` A, the
theory
⋃
n Thn is a consistent theory, containing E
i. Each Thn is a finitary
theory so, by the presence of ∀-Inf in Thn+1, there are sentences such that
Thn+1 ` T(pAq), but Thn 6` A. We prove
Thn+1 `ω T(pAq) if and only if Thn `ω A.
The right-to-left implication holds by definition. In order for the left-to-
right direction to hold, the axioms ∃-Inf and ∨-Inf of Thn+1 necessitate that
the disjunction and existence property hold for Thn. The next definition
introduces the machinery required to establish this.
Definition 5.2 Define a slash relation |n for every n as follows.
1. |nR(s1, . . . , sn) iff R(s1, . . . , sn) is true, where R is an n-ary primitive
recursive relation.
2. |0T(s) iff sN = pAq for some sentence A with HAT `ω A.
3. |n+1T(s) iff sN = pAq for some sentence A with Thn `ω A.
4. |n(A ∧B) iff |nA and |nB.
5. |n(A ∨B) iff |nA or |nB.
6. |n(A→ B) iff |nA implies |nB and Thn `ω A→ B.
7. |n∀xF (x) iff |nF (m¯) for every m.
8. |n∃xF (x) iff |nF (m¯) holds for some m.
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The slash relation allows the freedom to argue semantically, while still hold-
ing on to the important information from the theories of interest. This is
made clear by the following propositions.
Proposition 5.3 Let A be some LT-sentence. Then
(i). HAT `ω A implies Th0 `ω A ∧ T(pAq),
(ii). Thn `ω A implies Thn+1 `ω A ∧ T(pAq).
Proof (i). Argue by induction on the (transfinite) length of the deduction
HAT `ω A. If A is an axiom of HAT, BaseiT ` A and BaseiT + ∀-Inf ` T(pAq)
hold immediately. Applications of modus ponens in HAT are dealt with by T-
Imp in Th0. If Th0 `ω T(pB(m¯)q) for every m ∈ N, the ω-rule entails Th0 `ω
∀x T(pB(x˙)q), from which ∀-Inf implies Th0 `ω T(p∀xB(x)q). Therefore if
A was derived via the ω-rule we may easily deduce Th0 `ω A∧ T(pAq) from
the induction hypothesis.
(ii). Argue by induction on n with a subsidiary induction on the length
of the deduction Thn ` A. The main induction hypothesis implies every
axiom of Thn−1 is an axiom of Thn and by the above argument (with Thn
in place of HAT and Thn+1 in place of Th0) one easily obtains
Thn `ω A implies Thn+1 `ω A ∧ T(pAq). 
Proposition 5.4 |nA holds whenever A is a sentence and BaseiT `ω A.
Proof By induction on the derivation of BaseiT `ω A. Suppose A is an axiom
of BaseiT. If A is also an axiom of HAT but not an instance of the induction
schema, |nA naturally holds. As one can verify |nB(0¯)∧∀x(B(x)→ B(x+1))
implies |nB(m¯) for each m, and so |n∀xB(x), we also obtain |nA whenever
A is an instance of the induction schema in HAT. This leaves only the three
axioms of truth present in BaseiT to consider.
Each theory Thn is closed under modus ponens, thus |nT(pAq) and |nT(pA→
Bq) implies |nT(pBq), so |n∀x∀y(T(x)∧ T(x→. y)→ T(y)) is easily obtained.
For the second axiom we observe |nvali(m¯) holds if and only if m
is the code of an intuitionistically valid first-order sentence of LT, and
hence |nvali(pBq) implies |nT(pBq). As before, this leads us to conclude
|n∀x(vali(x)→ T(ucl. (x))).
Finally, |nAxPRA(m¯) holds if and only if m is the code of a non-logical
axiom of PRA; whence we deduce |n∀x(AxPRA(x)→ T(x)).
For the induction step A is derived by the ω-rule or modus ponens.
In either case we may conclude |nA by the induction hypothesis and the
definition of |n. 
Lemma 5.5 |nA implies Thn `ω A.
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Proof By induction on the complexity of A. Suppose A is atomic. If A is
arithmetical, Thn ` A, and if A = T(pBq) either n = 0 and HAT `ω B or
n > 0 and Thn−1 `ω B. In either case proposition 5.3 yields Thn `ω A. If
A is not atomic the result follows via the induction hypothesis. 
Theorem 5.6 The following hold for every n.
(i). Thn `ω A implies |nA,
(ii). Thn is a consistent theory in ω-logic,
(iii). Thn `ω A ∨B implies either Thn `ω A or Thn `ω B,
(iv). Thn `ω ∃xA(x) implies Thn `ω A(t) for some term t,
(v). Thn `ω T(s) implies there is a sentence A such that sN = pAq and
Thn `ω A.
Proof We prove (i)–(v) simultaneously by main induction on n with a sub-
sidiary induction on the length of the derivation in Thn.
We begin with (i) and provide the argument for all n simultaneously.
To ease notation it will be convenient to denote HAT by Th−1. Suppose
Thn `ω A.
Case I. A is an axiom of Thn. This case splits into a number of sub-cases
depending on A. Proposition 5.4 deals with the axioms of BaseiT, and if A
is T(pBq) for some B such that Thn−1 ` B, |nA holds by definition.
∨-Inf. The aim is to show |n∨-Inf. By the main induction hypothesis for
(iii) or proposition 5.1 (in the case n = 0) we know |nT(p¯ ∨. q¯) implies
|nT(p¯) ∨ T(q¯) for all p, q. Moreover, Thn ` T(p¯ ∨. q¯) → T(p¯) ∨ T(q¯) for
every p and q, whence
|nT(p¯ ∨. q¯)→ T(p¯) ∨ T(q¯),
and thus |n∀x∀y(T(x ∨. y)→ T(x) ∨ T(y)).
∃-Inf. The induction hypothesis for (iv) and proposition 5.1 imply, for a
formula A(x) with at most x free, |nT(pA(m¯)q) holds for some m
whenever |nT(p∃xA(x)q). Thus one obtains
|nT(p∃xA(x)q)→ ∃mT(pA(m˙)q),
and hence |n∃-Inf.
∀-Inf. By the ω-rule, |n∀xT(pA(x˙)q) implies |nT(p∀xA(x)q). Since ∀-Inf is
an axiom of Thn,
|n(∀xT(pA(x˙)q)→ T(p∀xA(x)q))
holds for every formula A with at most x free, so |n∀-Inf.
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T-Cons. The definition of |n entails |nT-Cons holds only if |nT(pAq)∧T(p¬Aq)
fails and Thn `ω T(pAq) ∧ T(p¬Aq) → ⊥ holds for every sentence A.
The latter obviously holds since Thn contains T-Cons. To show the
former observe that |nT(pAq) ∧ T(p¬Aq) fails if one of Thn−1 `ω A or
Thn−1 `ω ¬A fails, which, of course, must be the case since Thn−1 is
consistent in ω-logic by the induction hypothesis for (ii).
T-Del. T-Del is an axiom of Thn only if n > 0. Suppose |nT(pT(k¯)q). The
definition of |n implies Thn−1 `ω T(k¯). Since n > 0, the induction
hypothesis for (v) may be applied, yielding a sentence B with pBq = k
and Thn−1 `ω B; whence |nT(k¯). Thus, |nT(pT(k¯)q) implies |nT(k¯) and
so |nT-Del.
Case II. A is not an axiom of Thn. Thn `ω A therefore follows by modus
ponens or the ω-rule. In the case of modus ponens the induction hypothesis
implies |nB and |n(B → A) for some B. By the definition of the slash
relation this means |nA holds. The other case follows similarly.
Combining (i) and lemma 5.5 one obtains
Thn `ω A if and only if |nA,
from which (ii), (iii) and (iv) are immediate consequences. To see (v) sup-
pose Thn `ω T(pAq). (i) implies |nT(pAq), and so Thn−1 `ω A. By proposi-
tion 5.3 we conclude Thn `ω A. 
The next corollary is now an immediate consequence of theorem 5.6.
Corollary 5.7 Thn+1 `ω T(pAq) if and only if Thn `ω A.
Let Th∞ be the (finitary) theory given by Th∞ ` A if Thn `ω A for
some n. Th∞ can be axiomatised by BaseiT, T-Cons, ∀-Inf, ∃-Inf, ∨-Inf,
T-Del plus {T(pAq) : ∃nThn ` A}. Corollary 5.7 implies Th∞ is closed
under T-Elim and T-Intro. As we observed earlier, closure under ¬T-Intro
is a consequence of T-Intro and T-Cons, so Th∞ contains Ei. Therefore, if
Ei ` A there exists an n such that |nA holds, so Ei is consistent.
5.2 Consistency of Fi
The similarity between Fi and Ei inspires us to define a sequence of intu-
itionistic theories
Th′0 = Base
i
T + T-Comp(w) + ∀-Inf + ∃-Inf + ∨-Inf,
Th′n+1 = Th
′
0 + T-Del + {T(pAq) : A is an LT-sentence and Th′n ` A},
and attempt to prove
Th′n+1 `ω T(pAq) if and only if Th′n `ω A
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for every sentence A. In order to establish this we must first show that Th′n
has the disjunction and the existence property. We can use the same slash
relation |n as before adjusted to refer to Th′n; explicitly, |n is defined as in
definition 5.2 with clauses 3 and 6 replaced by
3. |n+1T(s) iff sN = pAq for some sentence A and Th′n `ω A;
6. |n(A→ B) iff |nA implies |nB and Th′n `ω A→ B.
Proposition 5.8 For every n ∈ N, Th′n is a consistent theory. Moreover,
the classical LT-structure 〈N,N〉 is a model of Th′n.
Proof Each Th′n is a sub-theory of Ai, which is modelled by 〈N,N〉. 
The following two lemmata can be proved using the same arguments as
the previous section. Again we let Th′−1 = HAT.
Lemma 5.9 For every n ≥ 0, Th′n−1 `ω A implies Th′n `ω A ∧ T(pAq).
Lemma 5.10 |nA implies Th′n `ω A.
Theorem 5.11 The following hold for every n,
(i). Th′n `ω A implies |nA,
(ii). Th′n has the disjunction and existence property,
(iii). Th′n `ω T(pAq) implies Th′n `ω A.
Proof In contrast to Ei, here one looks to establish |nT-Comp(w) in place
of |nT-Cons.1 To see that T-Comp(w) is slashed note that, by the definition
of |n, |n¬T(pBq) entails Th′n `ω ¬T(pBq), but the latter is ruled out by
proposition 5.8. Thus |nT-Comp(w) holds vacuously.
(ii) is now a consequence of (i) and lemma 5.10; while (iii) is a conse-
quence of (i) and lemma 5.9. 
Let Th′∞ be the theory extending Base
i
T by T-Del, T-Comp(w), ∀-Inf,
∃-Inf, ∨-Inf and {T(pAq) : ∃nTh′n ` A}. Th′∞ is consistent and closed
under T-Intro and T-Elim. It is also closed under ¬T-Elim vacuously, since
〈N,N〉 |= Th′∞ and so Th′∞ ` ¬T(pAq) never occurs. Therefore Fi is a
sub-theory of Th′∞ and so is consistent.
1Although |nT(pAq) ∧ T(p¬Aq) fails for every sentence A, one cannot infer |nT-Cons
unless, in fact, Th′n `ω T-Cons. If Th′n `ω T-Cons,
⋃
n Th
′
n will be a theory containing
T-Cons, ∀-Inf and closed under T-Intro; McGee [7] shows, however, that any such theory
is ω-inconsistent, contradicting proposition 5.8.
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5.3 Consistency of Gi
We would like to first explore the connection between T-In and T-Elim
as this marks a significant change from the classical setting. The classical
inconsistency between T-In and T-Elim arises when analysing the conse-
quences of the liar sentence, B ↔ ¬T(pBq) (that is, B ↔ (T(pBq) → ⊥)).
T-In implies B → T(pBq), so B → ⊥ and so ¬¬T(pBq). Arguing classically,
one may remove the double negation to obtain T(pBq) and thus derive B
by T-Elim, contradicting ¬B from earlier. If one were arguing within intu-
itionistic logic though, there would be no means to pass from ¬¬T(pBq) to
T(pBq), so the contradiction cannot be achieved. However,
BaseiT ` T(p¬Bq)→ (T(pBq)→ T(pAq))
for any sentence A of LT, since ¬B → (B → A) is intuitionistically valid,
and BaseiT + T-In ` T(p¬Bq). Therefore,
BaseiT + T-In ` T(pBq)→ T(pAq),
whence BaseiT + T-In ` ¬¬T(pBq) → ¬¬T(pAq), and so BaseiT + T-In `
¬¬T(pAq), for any sentence A. Thus, for Gi one has the peculiar scenario
in which
Gi ` ∀pAq¬¬T(pAq), but (3)
Gi ` T(pAq) if and only if Gi ` A. (4)
Our first attempt to manage eqs. (3) and (4) will see us mimic the
techniques of the preceding sections to obtain a sequence Si (for i ∈ N) of
theories each containing T-In. Defining a suitable slash relation will provide
an elegant means to show each Si is consistent, has the disjunction and
existence property and
Si+1 `ω T(pAq) if and only if Si `ω A. (5)
Moreover, eq. (5) and the presence of T-In in Si ensures Si+1 ⊆ Si, whence
we will obtain
⋂
n Sn, a consistent theory containing T-In, ∨-Inf, ∃-Inf, ∀-Inf,
T-Comp(w) and closed under T-Elim, T-Intro and ¬T-Elim. Although this
method does not incorporate the axiom→-Inf it will provide the motivation
for the second approach which does.
Define for each n ∈ N an intuitionistic theory Sn by
S0 = Base
i
T + T-In + T-Comp(w) + ∨-Inf + ∃-Inf + ∀-Inf +
+ {T(pAq) : A is an LT-sentence},
Sn+1 = Base
i
T + T-In + T-Comp(w) + ∨-Inf + ∃-Inf + ∀-Inf +
+ {T(pAq) : A is an LT-sentence and Sn ` A}.
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Let S˜ denote the theory whose axioms are given by
Ax(S˜) = {A : A is a sentence of LT and ∀n Sn `ω A}.
The set Ax(S˜) is already deductively closed, that is, if S˜ ` A and A is an
LT-sentence, ∀n Sn `ω A and so A ∈ Ax(S˜). We begin with the following
observations.
Lemma 5.12 For every n ∈ N, Sn `ω A implies Sn+1 `ω T(pAq).
Proof We proceed by transfinite induction on the length of the deduction
Sn `ω A. If no applications of the ω-rule were utilised, Sn ` A and so T(pAq)
is an axiom of Sn+1. Otherwise a mixture of the induction hypothesis, ω-rule
in Sn+1 and ∀-Inf imply the result. 
Lemma 5.13 For each n, Sn+1 ⊆ Sn.
Proof It suffices to show each axiom of Sn+1 of the form T(pAq) is derivable
in Sn. But if T(pAq) is such an axiom, Sn ` A by definition and T-In entails
Sn ` T(pAq). 
Definition 5.14 For each n define a slash relation ||n as follows.
1. ||nR(s1, . . . , sk) iff R(s1, . . . , sk) is true, where R is an k-ary primitive
recursive relation.
2. ||0T(s) iff sN = pAq for some sentence A.
3. ||n+1T(s) iff sN = pAq for some sentence A and Sn `ω A.
4. ||n(A ∧B) iff ||nA and ||nB.
5. ||n(A ∨B) iff ||nA or ||nB.
6. ||n(A→ B) iff ||nA implies ||nB and Sn `ω A→ B.
7. ||n∀xF (x) iff ||nF (m¯) for every m.
8. ||n∃xF (x) iff ||nF (m¯) holds for some m.
The significant difference between ||n and |n as given in definition 5.2 is the
behaviour of the base case, n = 0. In a similar manner to before we may
then deduce the following.
Lemma 5.15 For every n ∈ N, ||nA implies Sn `ω A.
Proposition 5.16 For every n ∈ N,
(i). Sn `ω A implies ||nA,
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(ii). Sn has the disjunction and existence property (in ω-logic).
Proof By induction on n. (i) consists of a further induction on the length
of the derivation.
Case I. n = 0. By definition ||0T(pAq) holds for all sentences A, thus one
easily verifies each of ∨-Inf, ∃-Inf and ∀-Inf are slashed. All instances of T-In
are also slashed. T-Comp(w) is vacuously slashed, since ||0¬T(pAq) fails for
every A.
Case II. n = m+1. We assess each axiom in turn; those of the form T(pBq)
are slashed by definition.
T-In. Suppose ||nA for some A. Lemma 5.15 implies Sn `ω A and by
lemma 5.13 we obtain Sm `ω A; whence ||nT(pAq).
T-Comp(w). ||n¬T(pAq) entails Sn `ω ¬T(pAq) and hence S0 `ω ¬T(pAq)
by lemma 5.13, which contradicts the consistency of S0 implied by
the induction hypothesis for n = 0. Therefore ||nT-Comp(w) holds
vacuously.
∨-Inf. Suppose ||nT(pA∨Bq). Then Sm `ω A∨B and hence, by the induction
hypothesis for (ii), either Sm `ω A or Sm `ω B, so ||nT(pAq)∨T(pBq).
∃-Inf. Suppose ||nT(p∃xA(x)q). Then Sm `ω ∃xA(x) and hence, by the
induction hypothesis, there is a k ∈ N for which Sm `ω A(k¯), so
||n∃x T(pA(x˙)q).
∀-Inf. Suppose ||n∀x T(pA(x˙)q). Then ||nT(pA(k¯))q) for every k ∈ N and so
Sm `ω A(k¯) for every k. Thus Sm `ω ∀xA(x) and ||nT(p∀xA(x)q).
In the induction step we argue according to the last logical rule applied. All
cases are, however, standard and identical to the proof of theorem 5.6.
(ii) is an immediate consequence of lemma 5.15 and (i). 
Proposition 5.16 and lemma 5.12 imply eq. (5) as desired. We may thus
conclude S˜, and so Gi without →-Inf, is a consistent theory.
Theorem 5.17
(i). S˜ is consistent,
(ii). S˜ ` T-In + T-Rep + ∀-Inf + ∃-Inf + ∨-Inf + T-Comp(w),
(iii). S˜ is closed under T-Intro, T-Elim and ¬T-Elim.
Proof ||n⊥ never holds by clause 1, so (i) is a consequence of proposi-
tion 5.16 (i). (ii) holds because all the axioms listed belong to the theory
Sn for every n.
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(iii). Closure under T-Intro is obvious because of the presence of T-In
in S˜. If S˜ ` T(pAq), the previous proposition implies ||nT(pAq) holds for
every n, thus, by the definition of ||n, Sn `ω A for every n, and so S˜ ` A.
Therefore S˜ is closed under T-Elim. Closure under ¬T-Elim is a consequence
of T-Comp(w) and T-Elim. 
Corollary 5.18 The theory Gi without →-Inf is consistent.
Proof Gi without →-Inf is a sub-theory of S˜, and hence consistent by the-
orem 5.17. 
Had we attempted to incorporate →-Inf into the development of S˜, we
would have required the truth predicate to be interpreted by notions closer
to satisfaction and validity than provability. Assuming →-Inf is an axiom
of Sn+1, ||n+1(→-Inf) holds if and only if, for all sentences A, B,
Sn+1 `ω T(pAq)→ T(pBq) implies Sn `ω A→ B.
The solution will be to replace the interpretation of truth at each step by
validity in a certain Kripke structure An. One naturally requires, amongst
other things, the following criteria to be satisfied.
• An |= A ∨B implies An |= A or An |= B;
• An |= ∃xA(x) implies An |= A(t) for some term t;
• if An |= A implies An |= B, in fact An |= A→ B.
Such criteria are often associated with classical models, but as theorem 5.20
below shows, there are non-classical LT-structures which satisfy them. Let
 be the reverse ordering on the natural numbers and define T0 = {0} × N
and A0 = 〈{0},,T0〉. A0 is the ‘everything is true’ model used to verify
Ai. Assuming An and Tn are already defined, let
Tn+1 = {〈n+ 1, pAq〉 : An |= A} ∪ Tn,
An+1 = 〈{k : k ≤ n+ 1},,Tn+1〉.
Let T =
⋃
n Tn. It should be clear that the set T can safely replace Tn in
the definition of An. We claim the following.
a) An is an intuitionistic Kripke ω-model for every n.
b) The theory ThG∞ := {B : ∀nAn |= B} is a consistent theory containing
Gi.
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To deduce a) it is sufficient to show the persistency condition holds for An.
However, for every m ≤ n,
m An A iff m Ak A for every k ≥ m.
Thus, An |= A entails Am |= A for every m ≤ n, whence
{x : 〈n+ 1, x〉 ∈ T} ⊆ {x : 〈n, x〉 ∈ T}
for every n, as required.
ThG∞ is closed under modus ponens and contains Base
i
T, so Th
G
∞ forms
a theory (in fact an infinitary theory since it is also closed under the ω-
rule). Moreover, A0 |= ThG∞, so ThG∞ is consistent. The next proposition
and subsequent remarks show each axiom of Gi is contained in ThG∞, while
theorem 5.20 demonstrates ThG∞ is closed under T-Intro, T-Elim and ¬T-
Elim, whence we conclude ThG∞ extends Gi.
We write m  A to denote m Am A. By persistency, n  A implies
m An A for every m ≤ n, so
An |= A iff n  A. (6)
Also, for any sentence A of LT, n+ 1  T(pAq) if and only if n  A.
Proposition 5.19 For each m ∈ N,
(i). m  T-In,
(ii). m  T-Comp(w),
(iii). m  ∨-Inf,
(iv). m  ∃-Inf,
(v). m  ∀-Inf,
(vi). m →-Inf.
Proof By induction on m.
Case I. m = 0. A0 |= T(n¯) for every n, so (i)–(vi) hold trivially.
Case II. m = n+ 1. (i). As the induction hypothesis yields
k  A implies k  T(pAq) for every k < m, (7)
it suffices to show m  A implies m  T(pAq), so suppose m  A. By
persistency n  A, and hence m  T(pAq), as desired. Thus k  A entails
k  T(pAq) for every k ≤ m, so m  A→ T(pAq).
(ii). We need to establish m  ¬T(pAq) implies m  T(p¬Aq) for every
sentence A. However, m  ¬T(pAq) implies 0  ¬T(pAq), contradicting the
definition of A0. Thus m  T-Comp(w) vacuously.
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(iii). Suppose m  T(pA0 ∨ A1q). Then n  A0 ∨ A1 by definition and
so either n  A0 or n  A1. In either case m  T(pA0q) ∨ T(pA1q), and we
may conclude m  ∨-Inf through the induction hypothesis.
(iv). If m  T(p∃xA(x)q) we observe n  A(k¯) for some k ∈ N, whence
m  T(pA(k¯)q) and so m  ∃x T(pA(x˙)q). By the induction hypothesis we
obtain m  ∃-Inf.
(v). Since n  A(k¯) for every k ∈ N implies n  ∀xA(x), the induction
hypothesis entails m  ∀-Inf.
(vi). Suppose m  T(pAq) → T(pBq). Then k  T(pAq) implies k 
T(pBq) for every k ≤ m, and so k  A implies k  B for every k ≤ n by
definition. Hence n  A → B, so m  T(pA → Bq) and we may conclude
m →-Inf. 
Combining proposition 5.19 with eq. (6) we obtain
An |= T-In + T-Comp(w) + ∨-Inf + ∃-Inf + ∀-Inf +→-Inf.
On the other hand, An |= BaseiT, so An |= Sn.
Theorem 5.20 Gi is a consistent theory.
Proof We show Gi ` A implies
An |= A for every n ∈ N. (8)
The preceding remarks verify this for the axioms of Gi and if A was derived
via a logical rule, eq. (8) follows from the induction hypothesis. Moreover,
applications of T-Intro in Gi are trivialised by T-In. Suppose Gi ` A was
a result of T-Elim. Then Gi ` T(pAq) and, by the induction hypothesis,
An |= T(pAq) for every n ∈ N. So n+ 1  T(pAq), n  A and hence An |= A
for every n ∈ N as required. There is nothing to check for ¬T-Elim since if
Gi ` ¬T(pAq), the induction hypothesis yields A0 |= ¬T(pAq), contradicting
the choice of A0. 
5.4 Consistency of Hi
Let T̂h be BaseiT + T-Intro and define M to be the classical model
〈N, {pBq : B is an LT-sentence and T̂h `ω B}〉.
We claim M |= Hi. For this to hold we require T̂h to:
a) have the disjunction and existence property (so M |= ∨-Inf ∧ ∃-Inf);
b) be consistent under ω-logic (so M |= T-Cons);
c) be closed under T-Intro (so M |= T-Rep);
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d) be modelled by M (so M |= T-Out).
c) holds by definition, and b) is a consequence of d). However, M |= BaseiT,
so
T̂h `ω A implies M |= A,
whence d) holds. This leaves a), which we also need to hold when T̂h is
formulated with ω-rule (not simply as a finite theory) so as to also accom-
modate ∀-Inf. We introduce a further slash relation |̂ which is defined as |0
given in definition 5.2 but with clauses 2 and 6 replaced by
2. |̂ T(s) iff sN = pAq for some sentence A and T̂h `ω A.
6. |̂(A→ B) iff |̂A implies |̂B and T̂h `ω A→ B.
Lemma 5.21 |̂A implies T̂h `ω A.
Proof If A is T(s), |̂A implies T̂h `ω B where pBq = sN, whence T̂h `ω A
by T-Intro. The remaining cases are easily verified. 
Lemma 5.22 T̂h `ω A implies |̂A, and hence T̂h formulated in ω-logic has
the disjunction and existence property.
Proof The first part is shown by induction on the length of the derivation
as in theorem 5.6. By the previous lemma this yields |̂A iff T̂h `ω A, from
which it is clear T̂h has the disjunction and existence property. 
Combining lemmata 5.21 and 5.22 we obtain the following.
Proposition 5.23 M is a model for the theory extending BaseiT by T-Out,
T-Rep, T-Del, ∀-Inf, ∃-Inf, ∨-Inf and T-Cons.
Proof We treat each axiom in turn.
T-Rep. Since T̂h is closed under T-Intro, M |= T-Rep.
∀-Inf. As T̂h is formulated in ω-logic, we have
M |= ∀n T(pA(n˙)q)⇒ T̂h `ω A(n¯) for every n,
⇒ T̂h `ω ∀xA(x),
⇒M |= T(p∀xA(x)q),
and hence M |= ∀-Inf.
T-Out. M |= T̂h, so
M |= T(pAq)⇒ T̂h `ω A,
⇒M |= A.
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T-Del. A consequence of T-Out, above.
T-Cons. Since M |= T̂h, T̂h is consistent, and so M |= T-Cons.
∨-Inf. Follows from lemma 5.22:
M |= T(pA ∨Bq)⇒ T̂h `ω A ∨B,
⇒ T̂h `ω A or T̂h `ω B,
⇒M |= T(pAq) ∨ T(pBq),
and hence M |= ∨-Inf.
∃-Inf. Also follows from lemma 5.22:
M |= T(p∃xA(x)q)⇒ T̂h `ω ∃xA(x),
⇒ T̂h `ω A(s), for some closed term s,
⇒M |= T(pA(s)q),
⇒M |= ∃xT(pA(x˙)q),
and so M |= ∃-Inf. 
Theorem 5.24 Hi is consistent.
Proof We prove Hi ` A implies M |= A by induction on the length of the
deduction. In view of points a) to d), only applications of ¬T-Intro in Hi
need to be considered, so suppose Hi ` ¬A and M |= ¬A. If M |= T(pAq),
T̂h `ω A and hence M |= A; thus M |= T(pAq) fails. But M is a classical
model, so M |= ¬T(pAq). 
5.5 Consistency of Ii
We will construct a model for Ii based on M above. Ii contains T-Comp(w)
and ∨-Inf, but is inconsistent with T-Comp, thus a model for Ii must nec-
essarily be non-classical as opposed to just having a non-classical interpre-
tation for the truth predicate as was the case with Hi. We will deal with
T-Comp(w) in a similar manner to Gi by ensuring no world satisfies a sen-
tence of the form ¬T(pAq). Before this, however, we consider the sub-theory
of Ii without the axiom T-Comp(w). Define T˜h to be the theory extending
BaseiT by T-Rep, T-Del, ∀-Inf, ∨-Inf, ∃-Inf and the sentence T(pAq) whenever
T̂h `ω A.
Let M be the classical structure 〈N, {pBq : T̂h `ω B}〉 introduced in the
preceding section. Proposition 5.23 demonstrates that M is a model of T˜h,
whence we can deduce T˜h is closed under T-Elim.
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Lemma 5.25 T˜h `ω B implies M |= B, and T˜h `ω T(pAq) implies T˜h `ω
A.
Proof The first part is an immediate consequence of proposition 5.23, whence
T˜h `ω T(pAq)⇒M |= T(pAq),
⇒ T̂h `ω A,
⇒ T˜h `ω A.
The final implication follows on account of T̂h being a sub-theory of T˜h. 
As the classical structure 〈N,N〉 also forms a model of T˜h, T˜h is vacuously
closed under ¬T-Elim and we may establish the consistency of the sub-
theory of Ii without the axiom T-Comp(w).
Corollary 5.26 The theory Ii formulated without the axiom T-Comp(w),
labelled I˜i, is consistent.
Proof I˜i is axiomatised by BaseiT, T-Rep, T-Del, T-Elim, ¬T-Elim, ∀-Inf,
∃-Inf and ∨-Inf. T˜h contains all of these axioms and is closed under T-Elim
and ¬T-Elim; thus I˜i ` B implies T˜h `ω B for any LT-sentence B. By
lemma 5.25, T˜h is consistent and hence so is I˜i. 
To conclude that Ii itself is consistent we cannot use lemma 5.25 as M 6|=
T-Comp(w); for this we must turn to the Kripke model A˜ = 〈W,≤,T〉,
defined as the two-world intuitionistic Kripke model given by
W = {0, 1}, with 0 ≤ 1,
T = {1} × N ∪ {(0, pBq) : T̂h `ω B},
where T̂h is the theory BaseiT + T-Intro used above.
Lemma 5.27 T˜h `ω A implies A˜ |= A.
Proof We need to show T˜h `ω B implies 0 A˜ B and 1 A˜ B for every
sentence B. Since 0  B if and only if 〈N,N〉 |= B, the former is trivial
given 〈N,N〉 |= T˜h. For the latter, we begin with the axioms of T˜h which
we consider in turn. 1  B holds for every axiom B of BaseiT and if T̂h ` A,
1  T(pAq) by definition. This leaves the Optional Axioms T-Rep, T-Del,
∀-Inf, ∃-Inf and ∨-Inf to deal with.
T-Rep. T̂h is closed under T-Intro, so 1 
A˜
T-Rep.
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T-Del.
1 
A˜
T(pT(pBq)q)⇒ T̂h `ω T(pBq),
⇒M |= T(pBq),
⇒ T̂h `ω B,
⇒ 1 
A˜
T(pBq),
so 1 
A˜
T-Del.
∀-Inf. Holds since the interpretation of truth at 1 (and also at 0) is closed
under ω-logic.
∨-Inf. 1  ∨-Inf because T̂h has the disjunction property.
∃-Inf. 1  ∃-Inf since T̂h has the existence property.
For the induction step we assume T˜h `ω B is derived via modus ponens.
The induction hypothesis yields A |= A ∧ (A → B) for some sentence A,
from which we may readily deduce A |= B. This is also the case for an
application of the ω-rule and any other rule of inference in the derivation.
Due to the choice of A˜, 0  T(pBq) for every sentence B, so A˜ |= ¬T(pBq)
never holds. Thus A˜ |= T-Comp(w) and A˜ is a model of Ii.
Theorem 5.28 A˜ |= Ii, and so Ii is consistent.
Proof Let Th# denote the theory given by T˜h together with T-Comp(w),
that is, Th# denotes the theory
BaseT + T-Rep + T-Del + T-Comp(w) + ∀-Inf +
+ ∃-Inf + ∨-Inf + {T(pBq) : T̂h ` B}.
(9)
We will prove
a) Th# `ω A implies A˜ |= A; and
b) Th# is closed under T-Elim and ¬T-Elim (when formulated in ω-logic),
and hence Ii is a sub-theory of Th#.
a) is a consequence of the lemma 5.27. For b), closure under ¬T-Elim
is vacuous, since A˜ |= ¬T(s) never holds and so Th# 6` ¬T(pAq) for any
sentence A. Th# is closed under T-Elim since Th# `ω T(pAq) implies T̂h `ω
A by the first part and T̂h is a sub-theory of Th#. 
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6 Inconsistencies
Having shown the consistency of each of the nine theories listed in theo-
rem 4.1, we now turn to the task of showing every subset of the Optional
Axioms not contained in one of the theories is inconsistent over BaseiT. For
some subsets the arguments presented in [3] are valid intuitionistically and
so no further work is required to deduce their inconsistency. However, many
of the derivations do make use of the classical principles inherent in BaseT
and it is not obvious whether or not these can be dispensed with. As we
shall see, all but one of the classical inconsistencies has a purely intuition-
istic proof. It is important to note that the usual diagonal argument used
to construct the liar sentence and its variants may be carried out in purely
intuitionistic logic; the argument requires no classical principles. We will
abuse notation for the remainder of the section and write T(A) in place of
T(pAq).
Let B denote the liar sentence; that is, B ↔ ¬T(B). Note
BaseiT ` T(B ↔ ¬T(B)),
so BaseiT ` T(B) ↔ T¬T(B). However, the sentence T(¬B) ↔ TT(B), which
is a theorem of BaseT, is not derivable in Base
i
T, due to the non-classical
nature of the truth predicate.
The subsets of the Optional Axioms for which the argument in [3] suffices
to deduce their inconsistency over BaseiT are: T-In, T-Out; T-In, ¬T-Intro;
T-Out, ¬T-Elim; T-Out, T-Intro; T-Cons, T-Rep, T-Intro. The remaining
inconsistencies are presented below with their new proofs according to the
order of appearance in [3].
Inconsistencies concerning T-Cons.
T-Cons, T-In: B → T(B) and B ↔ ¬T(B), so ¬B and ¬¬T(B), but
also T(¬B), whence ¬T(B) by T-Cons. ><
T-Cons, T-Rep,
¬T-Elim:
T(B)→ TT(B) and T(B)↔ T¬T(B), so ¬T(B), and
B, but also ¬B. ><
T-Cons, T-Del,
¬T-Elim:
TT(B)→ T(B) and T(B)↔ T¬T(B), so
TT(B)→ T¬T(B), ¬TT(B), ¬T(B), and B but also
¬B. ><
Inconsistencies concerning T-Comp(w) or T-Comp.
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T-Comp(w), T-Out: T(B)→ B and T(B)→ ¬B, so ¬T(B), T(¬B), ¬B,
but also B. ><
T-Comp(w), T-Rep,
¬T-Intro:
¬T-Intro yields T-Cons, so ¬(TT(B) ∧ T¬T(B)). Also
T(B)→ TT(B) and T(B)↔ T¬T(B), so ¬T(B),
¬TT(B), T¬T(B) and so T(B). ><
T-Comp(w), T-Del,
¬T-Intro:
¬T(B)→ ¬TT(B), ¬TT(B)→ T¬T(B) and
T¬T(B)↔ T(B), so ¬T(B)→ T(B), ¬¬T(B), ¬B,
whence also ¬T(B). ><
T-Comp, T-Rep,
T-Elim:
T¬T(B)↔ T(B), T(B)→ TT(B) and TT(B)∨ T¬T(B),
so TT(B), T(B), B and ¬T(B). ><
T-Comp, T-Del,
T-Elim:
TT(B) ∨ T¬T(B), so T(B), ¬B but also B. ><
Inconsistencies concerning T-Cons and T-Comp(w).
T-Cons, T-Comp(w),
T-Rep, T-Elim:
T-Rep and T-Cons yield ¬T(B), so T(¬B), ¬B, but
also B. ><
T-Cons, T-Comp(w),
T-Del, T-Elim:
T-Comp(w) and T-Del imply ¬¬T(B), so ¬B, but
also T(¬¬B), whence ¬¬B. ><
T-Cons, T-Comp(w),
T-Rep, T-Del:
T-Rep and T-Cons yield ¬T(B), while T-Del and
T-Comp(w) implies ¬¬T(B). ><
T-Cons, T-Comp(w),
T-Del, T-Intro:
¬¬T(B), so ¬B, T(¬B), ¬T(B), and B. ><
T-Comp implies T-Comp(w), so all the inconsistencies listed above in-
volving T-Comp(w) also hold for T-Comp. The above list covers almost all
cases and leaves only two subsets to consider: the triple of principles T-Del,
T-Elim and →-Inf; and the quadruple T-Intro, T-Rep, T-Del and T-Elim.
The first set is inconsistent due to the special behaviour of →-Imp.
Lemma 6.1 All subsets of the Optional Axioms containing the principles
T-Del, →-Inf and T-Elim are inconsistent over BaseiT.
Proof T-Del and →-Inf imply T(T(A) → A) for every sentence A, whence
T-Elim yields T-Out. On the other hand, →-Inf implies T-Comp(w) which
is inconsistent with T-Out as shown above. 
To deal with the second subset, Friedman and Sheard use of a form of Lo¨b’s
Theorem. Their proof, however, makes use of classical principles which are
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not obviously redundant. The next lemma provides an intuitionistic, and
also simpler, proof of the theorem under the same assumptions.
Lemma 6.2 (Schematic Lo¨b’s Theorem) If S is a theory extending BaseiT,
T-Rep and T-Intro, and A is a sentence of LT,
S ` T(T(A)→ A)→ T(A).
Proof By the diagonal lemma pick a sentence F such that
S ` F ↔ T(F → A).
An application of T-Intro yields
S ` T(F ↔ T(F → A)). (10)
We now argue informally within S. Assume
T(F → A).
T-Rep implies T(T(F → A)), so T(F ) by eq. (10), and so T(A). Thus,
S ` T(F → A)→ T(A), (11)
whence a further application of T-Intro entails
S ` T(T(F → A)→ T(A)). (12)
Now assume, within S, T(T(A)→ A). Then we deduce
T(T(F → A)→ A), by eq. (12),
T(F → A), by eq. (10),
T(A), by eq. (11),
that is, S ` T(T(A)→ A)→ T(A). 
It is worth remarking that had we assumed the axiom T-Rep was given in
its quantified form, the above proof may be generalised to deduce, under
the same assumptions,
S ` ∀pAq (T(T(A)→ A)→ T(A)).
In place of the diagonal lemma one makes use of its parametrised form which
allows the construction of a formula F (x) such that
S ` ∀pAq(F (pAq)↔ T(pF (pAq)→ Aq).
As the sentence A does not occur outside the scope of the truth predi-
cate in the proof of lemma 6.2, the remainder of the proof may proceed as
before. Notice that the parametrised form of T-Intro follows from the non-
parametrised form due to the fact that BaseiT ` T(p∀xA(x)q)→ T(pA(x˙)q),
and thus this form is available for use in the proof.
The remaining inconsistency is now easily verified.
32
Lemma 6.3 All subsets of the Optional Axioms containing the four axioms
T-Intro, T-Elim, T-Rep and T-Del are inconsistent over BaseiT.
Proof If we assume T-Del we have TT(A) → T(A) for every sentence A.
Assuming, further, T-Intro yields T(TT(A) → T(A)) for every A. The pre-
vious lemma thus shows the triple T-Del, T-Intro and T-Rep implies T(A)
for every LT-sentence A and so with the presence of T-Elim one obtains a
contradiction. 
7 Completing the proof of the main theorem
We can now complete the proof of theorem 4.1. Section 5 shows that each of
the nine theories are consistent and section 6 provides the necessary results
to see they are maximally so. All that remains is to show these are the
only maximal consistent subsets of the Optional Axioms. Let OAc denote
the set of classical Optional Axioms, excluding ∃-Inf, and let OAi be the
set of axioms {∃-Inf, ∨-Inf, T-Comp(w), →-Inf}. Suppose, in search of a
contradiction, that R is a consistent subset of the Optional Axioms (over
BaseiT) which is not a subset of any of the nine theories listed in theorem 4.1.
R can be viewed as S1∪S2 where S1 ⊆ OAc and S2 ⊆ OAi. By the combined
work of [3, §4] and section 6 we see that S1 must be a subset of (at least)
one of the nine theories Ai to Ii and the only situation where one may obtain
a consistent subset of the Optional Axioms which is not included in the list
is if S2 contains →-Inf and S1 is a subset of one of Fi or Ii, or S2 contains
T-Comp(w) and S1 is a subset of either E
i or Hi. We thus have two cases
to consider based on S2, each with a further two sub-cases dealing with the
choice of S1.
Case Ia. S2 contains →-Inf and S1 ⊆ Fi. Since →-Inf logically implies T-
Comp(w) we may assume, without loss of generality, that S2 also contains
T-Comp(w). Lemma 6.2 entails S1 does not contain one of T-Elim or T-Del.
Without T-Elim, R is a subset of Ai; and without T-Del, R is contained in
Di, contradicting the assumption.
Case Ib. S2 contains →-Inf and S1 ⊆ Ii. Again one of T-Del and T-Elim
is not contained in S1 and hence R is contained in either A
i or Gi.
Case IIa. S2 contains T-Comp(w) and S1 ⊆ Ei. Unless R is a subset of Di,
S1 must contain T-Del. Likewise, to avoid F
i (and thus case Ia above), S1
must contain T-Cons. But then, each of T-Elim, T-Intro and ¬T-Intro is
inconsistent with R, and R is a subset of Ci.
Case IIb. S2 contains T-Comp(w) and S1 ⊆ Hi. T-Out is inconsistent with
T-Comp(w), so S1 does not contain T-Out. We may assume S1 contains T-
Rep as otherwise S1 is a subset of E
i and by the previous case, we are
done. To avoid Ii (and hence case Ib above), S1 must contain T-Cons or
¬T-Intro; either way R is consistent with T-Cons. So R is consistent with
T-Rep, T-Comp(w) and T-Cons and to avoid inconsistency we see that S1
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may not contain T-Del, ¬T-Intro or T-Elim. Thus R is a subset of T-
Rep, T-Comp(w), T-Cons, ∀-Inf, T-Comp, ∃-Inf, ∨-Inf, →-Inf, and hence is
contained in Bi.
8 Conclusion
With intuitionistic logic we obtain more freedom to assert additional natural
principles about truth. The principles ∨-Inf and T-Comp(w), for example,
are independent over BaseiT but equivalent over the fully classical BaseT.
Although we still obtain exactly nine maximal consistent sets of the Op-
tional Axioms, more would appear if we allow mixed scenarios, e.g. if the
underlying logic of the base theory is classical but the logic of the truth
predicate is intuitionistic. For instance, the theory I˜i of corollary 5.26 may
be formulated in classical logic while still maintaining an intuitionistic truth
predicate since the models used in the proof of its consistency are all clas-
sical.2 Let us denote this new theory by Ic. Due to the presence of classical
logic, T-Comp(w) is inconsistent with Ic and so Ic is not a subset of any
of the intuitionistic theories Ai–Ii. Ic, however, maintains the axioms ∨-Inf
and ∃-Inf, so nor is it contained in any of Friedman and Sheard’s classical
theories. Thus Ic is a new maximal consistent theory. Likewise theorem 5.24
shows Hi can also be consistently formulated in classical logic, again with
an intuitionistic truth predicate; let us denote this theory by Hc. Note,
however, Hc does not represent an additional maximal consistent theory as
Hc extends Hi. Furthermore, formulating any theory containing T-Intro in
classical logic results in a classical truth predicate and hence in a theory
extending BaseT.
3 Thus, adding the law of excluded middle to the collection
of Optional Axioms and allowing the user to insist upon a theory based on
classical logic yields as possible maximal consistent theories A–G, Ei–Gi, Ii,
Hc, and Ic, a total of thirteen theories.
Theorem 8.1 Let OA+ denote the set containing all fifteen Optional Ax-
ioms and the law of excluded middle (the axiom schema ‘A ∨ ¬A’). Every
consistent subset of OA+ over BaseiT is contained in one of the following
theories.
– A, B, C, D, E, F, G (Classical theories with a classical truth predicate);
– Hc or Ic (Classical theories with an intuitionistic truth predicate);
2In particular, the theory T˜h, upon which the consistency of I˜i relies, can also be
formulated in classical logic; lemmata 5.25 and 5.25 still hold.
3This is not entirely true as the combination of classical logic and T-Intro would yield,
in general, only T(pA ∨ ¬Aq) for every sentence A whereas BaseT ` ∀pAqT(pA ∨ ¬Aq).
This discrepancy, however, has no affect on the problems of consistency we are addressing
here.
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– Ei, Fi, Gi, Ii (Intuitionistic theories with an intuitionistic truth predi-
cate).
Moreover, each theory in the above list contains a subset of OA+ which is
not contained in any other theory.
Proof That each of these theories is consistent has already been established.
This leaves two remaining tasks: show every consistent subset of OA+ is
contained in one of the thirteen theories; and associate to each theory a
unique maximal consistent subset of OA+.
For the former it suffices to show every consistent subset of the Optional
Axioms not extended by any of the proposed classical theories is inconsistent
with the law of excluded middle. To that aim, suppose S is a consistent
subset of the Optional Axioms but is not a subset of any of the nine classical
theories listed above and suppose, in search of a contradiction, that S is
consistent with the law of excluded middle. In particular S must be a subset
of one of Ei, Fi, Gi or Ii (any other intuitionistic theory is a sub-theory of
one of the classical theories in the list), and be inconsistent with the axiom
T-Comp. Consider the following facts.
a) The pair T-In, T-Elim is inconsistent with classical logic;
b) T-Comp(w) entails T-Comp over classical logic;
c) →-Inf implies T-Comp(w) over BaseiT;
d) ∨-Inf and T(pA ∨ ¬Aq) logically implies T(pAq) ∨ T(p¬Aq);
e) ∃-Inf and T(pA ∨ ¬Aq) imply T(pAq) ∨ T(p¬Aq) over BaseiT.
The first has already been remarked, b) and c) were proved in proposition 3.3
and d) is immediate. e) is a result of the argument that ∃-Inf implies T-
Comp over BaseT.
Combining these facts we see that S cannot contain both T-In and T-
Elim, nor can S contain either T-Comp(w) or →-Inf, as part of the assump-
tions entail T-Comp is inconsistent with S. This means S must now be a
subset of one of Ei, Fi or Gi and, moreover, S must contain at least one of
the axioms ∃-Inf, ∨-Inf. But, if S does not contain T-Intro it is also a subset
of either Hc, Ic or A, and if S contains T-Intro, either d) or e) entails that S
is consistent with T-Comp, yielding a contradiction.
We now move to the second task, namely associating with each theory
in the list a subset of OA+ which is unique to that theory. For the theories
A–D, Ei, Fi, Gi, Hc and Ii simply pick the corresponding maximal consistent
set given by theorem 4.1. For the remainder, E, F, G and Ic, pick the set
of Optional Axioms proscribed by theorem 3.2 and add the law of excluded
middle. 
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Another candidate for inclusion in the list of Optional Axioms (and
arguably a more natural choice than the excluded middle) is the principle
∀pAq T(pA∨¬Aq) stating that the truth predicate contains classical logic. At
first sight, it might appear that this axiom would enable one to construct new
maximal consistent theories based on intuitionistic logic while maintaining
a classical truth predicate. The next theorem, however, demonstrates one
does not obtain any theories not already encountered.
Theorem 8.2 Let T-Class denote the axiom ∀pAq T(pA ∨ ¬Aq), and let S
be some subset of the Optional Axioms. BaseiT + S + T-Class is consistent if
and only if BaseT + S is consistent.
Proof BaseiT + T-Class is a sub-theory of BaseT so the right-to-left implica-
tion holds trivially. To show the converse suppose, in search of a contradic-
tion, BaseiT + S + T-Class is consistent, but BaseT + S is inconsistent. S must
therefore be a subset of one of the nine intuitionistic theories Ai to Ii but
not a subset of any of the classical Friedman-Sheard theories A to I. Thus S
contains one of T-Comp(w), ∨-Inf, →-Inf or ∃-Inf, and BaseiT + S + T-Comp
is inconsistent. Furthermore, the proof of the preceding theorem (specifi-
cally points d) and e) on the previous page) shows S cannot contain ∨-Inf or
∃-Inf. Therefore, S is a subset of Fi, Gi or Ii, and we may assume S contains
T-Comp(w) (as →-Inf implies T-Comp(w) over BaseiT). S cannot contain
T-Elim, as otherwise BaseiT + S + T-Class would extend BaseT; but then S is
a subset of A, contradicting the assumptions. 
Although the addition of T-Class does not create any extra theories of
truth, it does allow one to differentiate between the classical theories E–I and
the intuitionistic theories Ei–Ii. In particular, the triple {T-Out,∨-Inf,T-Class}
is inconsistent, but the two sets {T-Out,∨-Inf} and {T-Out,T-Class} are
consistent over BaseiT; they correspond to the theories H
c and H respectively.
Using only subsets of the original fifteen Optional Axioms and the law of
excluded middle, one is unable to differentiate between the two cases.
Theorem 8.3 Allowing the axiom T-Class as an additional Optional Ax-
iom one obtains exactly fourteen maximal consistent theories, whereas al-
lowing both T-Class and the law of excluded middle provides exactly fifteen
maximal consistent theories.
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